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Abstract 
Collusion  and  soft  budget  constraint  are  two  conspicuous  phenomena  in  transition 
economies’ banking system. Literature has separately investigated those two phenomena 
from theoretical point of views. However, the cross-point of both phenomena has been 
neglected in the research of banking regulation. The present paper addresses this issue in 
a simple model of two-period contract with termination at the end of the first period. By 
comparing the two hierarchies -- “bank-firm” and “government-bank-firm”, we show that 
the government’s non-commitment and banking bailout cause inefficiency in the contact 
relationship. Moreover, after introducing collusion possibility, non-commitment of the 
government increases the stakes, or bribes, which the collusive bank can extract, and 
makes it more costly for the government to implement this contract. However, taking into 
account the fact that the bank is collusive, the government who aims to prevent collusion 
will switch to the other equilibrium where she sticks to her commitment and excludes 
collusion  from  the  contract  relationship.  Here,  collusion  plays  a  role  as  a  hardening 
budget constraint device. Some policy implications are suggested at the end. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Collusion  and  soft  budget  constraint  are  two  conspicuous  phenomena  in  transition 
economies’ banking system. There is a lot of literature which has separately investigated 
these two subjects from theoretical point of views. However, the cross-point of these two 
subjects has been neglected in the research of banking regulation, and it is worthy to 
investigate whether there is any relationship between collusion and soft budget constraint 
if these two phenomena co-exist in transition economies, or furthermore, whether one of 
these phenomena amplifies the effect of the other. 
 
Soft budget constraint (SBC) is actually a commitment issue in an economic system. 
Modern studies focus on the transitional economies’ “lack of financial disciplines in the 
state  sector”  (Kornai,  1980,  1992).  The  unenforceable  bankruptcy  threats,  as  well  as 
various  subsidies,  credits,  and  price-supports,  etc.,  cause  this  lack  of  discipline, 
recognized by Kornai (1979, 1980)  
The  SBC  episode  is  not  the  exclusive  phenomenon  in  transition  economics.  The 
market economy cannot be immune to SBC. Notable recent examples of its mischief 
include  the  US  government’s  bailouts  in  the  Savings  and  Loans  and  the  Long-Term 
Capital Management crisis, French government’s bailout in Credit Lyonnais. Especially 
in the financial system, SBC has broken the boundary of the market economy and the 
centralized economy. 
To  model  the  soft  budget  constraint  as  a  financial  commitment  problem  is  the 
mainstream approach which has been adopted by many transition economists. They focus 
on the inability to prevent an ex ante financial plan (or budget) from being renegotiated 
ex post. The second approach has also been used to model the soft budget constraint as 
instruments to solve a moral hazard problem. However, the first approach is a prevailing 
one and there are substantial empirical literatures that support the validity of this point of 
view. 
First, the original work of Kornai (1980) characterizes soft budget constraints into two 
major features: (i) ex post renegotiation of firms’ financial contracts; and (ii) a public 
ownership between the firms and the government (a “vertical relationship” in Kornai’s   3 
phrase). He just presented the two features separately and did not look into the question 
whether there is any relationship between them. 
However, Maskin and Xu (2001) show that these two features are intrinsically related. 
Moreover, they argue that both features are not only central to the fundamental problem 
of centralized economies, but also bear on major issues in economics more generally, 
such  as  the  boundary  of  the  firm  (Coase,1937)  and  the  capital  structure  of  the  firm 
(Modigliani  and  Miller,1958).  As  Coase  said,  the  proper  location  of  the  boundary  is 
determined  by  trading  off  the  effectiveness  of  two  co-ordination  mechanisms, 
“administrative  control”  and  “market”.  And  a  major  factor  affecting  the  trade-off  is 
commitment. Maskin and Xu show that the decentralized nature of the market makes 
renegotiation in market relations harder than under administrative control. Moreover, as a 
typical  thinking  of  a  firm’s  optimal  capital  structure,  debt  imposes  greater  financial 
discipline than equity on managers since debt increases the chance that the firm goes to 
bankruptcy.  Maskin  and  Xu  show  that  this  threat  is  compromised  if  the  firm  can 
renegotiate its way out of bankruptcy. Thus, the optimal debt/equity ratio turns on the 
hardness of the budget constraint imposed by debt. 
Dewatripont-Maskin  model  (Dewatripont  and  Maskin,  1995)  is  one  of  the  early 
theories to endogenize the soft  budget constraint as a financial commitment problem. 
They stress dynamic commitment problems in the presence of irreversible investment. By 
analyzing the soft budget constraint under centralized and decentralized banking systems, 
they show that paternalism, which is cited by Kornai as the cause of SBC, is neither a 
necessary nor a sufficient condition for SBC. They provide other tools to understand SBC 
under paternalism but also beyond paternalism. 
There are some other explanations of the soft budget constraint (for example, Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1994) which are related to the politics: the reason that a government bails out 
a firm or a bank comes from the fact that the political price of permitting bankruptcy is 
too high. The incentive to refinance a slow project will be even stronger than in the 
standard model since the benefit from refinancing is higher, or the social planner has 
some stakes in such a behavior. Especially in a banking system, the central bank will not 
just  let  the  local  banks  go  to  bankruptcy  and then  she  has  to  deal  with  systematical   4 
financial crisis. In any case, the central bank would like to rescue those local banks which 
are suffering from a huge amount of bad loans. 
The  earlier  analysis  of  the  bad  loan  problem  has  emphasized  the  need  for  bank 
recapitalization  as  the  appropriate  solution  (Begg  and  Portes,  1993,  Mitchell,  1994). 
However,  such  recapitalization  could  only  occur  once.  Otherwise  the  expectation  of 
future bailouts would seriously dampen banks’ incentives. Accumulation of bad loans 
indeed strengthens pressure to bail out banks and the expectation of bailouts gives fewer 
incentives to banks to improve their loan portfolio. This is a clear example of the soft 
budget constraint syndrome. 
The soft budget constraint of firms comes from the commitment of banking system. 
Therefore, in order to harden the firms’ budget constraint, as Maskin and Xu (2001) 
mentioned in their article, we need to reform the banking system. 
Faure-Grimaud and Rochet (1998) proposed a way to solve the soft budget constraints 
for banks in transition economies. As they stated, one can raise the cost of funds to banks 
through increasing the capital requirements, which can make it less attractive to refinance 
the  bad  projects.  In  addition,  they  studied  two  ways  of  privatization  on  soft  budget 
constraints, through putting current or new management in charge of banks. Given that 
the current bank managers (supervisors) have a better knowledge of the existing loan 
portfolio than do newcomers, these managers have an advantage in extracting surplus 
from  firms  whenever  refinancing  occurs.  This  supervisor  rent-seeking  ability  may 
exacerbate the soft budget constraint syndrome because it makes refinancing more likely. 
And so, they concluded, it may be better to put outsiders in charge precisely because their 
information is poorer. 
Not only firms have the soft budget constraint problem, banks, as special firms, also 
have the soft budget constraint themselves. Whether to bail out failing banks is a crucial 
problem in all the banking systems. How to bail out the failing banks also affects the 
bank manager (supervisor)’s behavior with the firms. Aghion, Bolton and Fries (1996) 
argue that a major source of soft budget constraints is the bank managers (supervisors)’ 
incentives to misreport their banks’ loan losses, and this can lead to banking crises. In 
their model, the bank manager s (supervisors)’ ex ante incentives to lend, as well as their 
ex post incentives to disclose a non-performing loan problem truthfully, could be strongly   5 
affected by different bank bailout rules. For “a tough recapitalization” policy followed 
by dismissal of the bank manager (supervisor), the manager will try to under-report or 
completely hide losses by rolling over bad loans, in order not to lose his job. Thus such a 
policy may result in worsening adverse selection problem and in softening firm’s budget 
constraints. However, if the manager of a failing bank is not dismissed, which is called “a 
soft recapitalization”, he has incentives to over liquidate the nonperforming firm, and 
will exaggerate his recapitalization requirements.  
 
The collusion literature follows Tirole(1986). In his original work, Tirole broke up the 
former economists’ tradition of ignorance of coalitions with side-contracting power in the 
design of incentive schemes. Furthermore, he conducted research on the efficiency losses 
that  can  result  from  collusion  with  side-payments  in  a  principal-supervisor-agent 
hierarchy. The coalitions with implicit side-contracts are more easily to be implemented 
in  a  long-time  relationship  through  a  mechanism  similar  to  reputation  game.  In  this 
relationship, repeated games enhance not only productivity, but also opportunities for 
collusion.  Although  dismissing  supervisor  or  other  impediments  may  succeed  in 
destroying coalitions, they may also be costly and induce incentive rents for the principal. 
Another research on collusion has been carried out by Kofman and Lawarree(1993). 
They illustrated how collusion can be constrained by creating an alternative source of 
information. Unlike Tirole, they introduced a second supervisor (the same level as the 
first supervisor), whose sole purpose is to discourage deviant coalitions. Denoting the 
first supervisor as the internal auditor and the second one as the external auditor, they use 
imperfect audit technology which allows the internal auditor and the manager to collude. 
Auditors are useful only if they have good information and if the manager’s liability is 
high.  However,  expected  maximum  deterrence  is  not  desirable  and  production  is 
suboptimal, even with unbounded punishments, risk-neutral agents, and costless auditing. 
Increase of punishment on the manager raises the bribe he can offer to the auditor, which 
raises the cost of preventing collusion. 
Olsen and Torsvik (1998) studied collusive behavior as a second best solution for lack 
of commitment. They adopted the three-tier principle-supervisor-agent relationship used 
by Laffont and Tirole (1991) and extended  it to a two-period dynamic version. In the   6 
second period, the principal may renegotiate her initial contract with the supervisor and 
the agent. This time-inconsistency problem may delay information revelation and induce 
efficiency loss. However, corruption has the side effect of functioning as a commitment 
device.  Besides  its  negative  static  effects  to the  principal,  corruption  makes  it  in  the 
principal’s  interest  to  reduce  the  agent’s  information  rent  when  the  future  arrives.  It 
alleviates the commitment problem. The relaxation effect that corruption imposes on the 
dynamic information revelation constraint can create long-time gains which offset the 
static efficiency loss. 
 
The present paper is related to two areas of literature. One of them address that if 
insolvent banks are capitalized and bank managers are not dismissed, solvent banks have 
an incentive to overstate their levels of bad debt through excessive liquidation of loans in 
default in order to qualify for recapitalization. (see Aghion, Bolton, and Fries (1999)). 
Their misreporting is similar to our untruthfully revealing in the collusion case. We also 
show that recapitalization makes it more attractive for the bank manager to collude with 
the firm and to untruthfully reveal the information. However, our model is different from 
theirs since termination of bad-performing firm is optimal and credible in their model, but 
it is not always the case in ours. This loss of credibility is analyzed as non-commitment in 
our model. The other area of literature studies the collusive behavior as a second best 
solution for lack of commitment. ( see Olsen and Torsvik(1998)). Their model focuses on 
the  renegotiation  of  the  initial  contract  and  investigates  on  how  collusion  alleviates 
information  revelation  delay  and  efficiency  loss  because  of  this  time-inconsistency 
problem. Similarly, we also find collusion has the effect of functioning as a commitment 
enhancing device. But our model concentrates on the commitment of terminating the bad-
performing firm, which is a typical problem in the literature of the soft budget constraint, 
and investigates the collusion’s effect on strengthening budget constraint.  
 
The structure of this paper is presented as follows: in section 2, we develop a dynamic 
model in which the soft budget constraint emerges because of the government’s rescue. 
Further more, in section 3 we introduce the supervision technology and analyze how the 
SBC problem exacerbates the collusion problem. On the other hand, we illustrate how   7 
SBC has been affected by the bank manager (supervisor)’s collusive behavior. At last, we 
arrive to the conclusion and policy implications in section 4. 
 
2. The Model  
 
    The main idea of this section is to show how the government’s bailout changes the 
bank’s decision rule and the bank’s commitment to the firm. In the next section, we will 
show how the government’s capitalization policy makes it more attractive for the bank 
and the firm to collude in order to obtain the bribes and the rents plus the private benefits 
respectively.  First,  commitment  in  this  dynamic  moral  hazard  model  is  defined  as 
stopping refinancing if the firm fails, which is similar to the termination rule in Bolton 
and  Scharfstein  (1990),  whose  key  point  is  that  investors  can  mitigate  managerial 
incentive problems by committing to terminate funding if a firm’s performance is poor. 
This commitment could be changed by the government’s bailing out to the bank. At the 
same  time,  we  lose  ex  ante  efficiency  because  of  the  change  of  commitment  and 
introducing of the public ownership will induce over investment. Second, the collusive 
behavior occurs if the government uses the bank as a supervisor who is in charge of the 
firm’s  project  choice,  where  we  adopt  the  supervision  pattern  in  Holmstrom  and 
Tirole(1997). The government’s bailout, say, recapitalization of the bank, can make it 
attractive for the supervisor to hide the information concerning the firm’s choice, and 
attractive for the firm to reap all the private benefits from choosing the bad project, as 
well as the rents from the supervisor’s misreporting on the firm’s choice. As a result, we 
find  that the  loss  of  commitment during the  bank  bailout  leaves  more  stakes  for the 
corrupt supervisor and the firm. 
Above all, we assume that the firm has no cash himself and could only borrowF  per 
period, which is the investment cost, if the bank agrees to lend. After the firm gets the 
loan, it invests into the good project or the bad project, both with the return R  when it 
succeeds  and  the  return  0  when  it  fails,  where 0 R F > > .  Here  all  the  returns  are 
verifiable for the players. If the firm chooses the good (resp. bad) project, the probability 
of success is  1 π  (resp. 0 π ), where 1 0
1
2
π π > >  and  1 0 1 > +π π  . Without loss of generality, 
we assume that choosing the good project is socially efficient, which is  1R F π > , but   8 
choosing the bad project is not, which is  0R F π < . However, by choosing the bad project, 
the firm gets a private benefit B , where we assume that R B π ∆ < < 0 , ( 0 1 π π π − = ∆ ), 
which means, the firm’s private benefit from the bad project is lower than the social 
efficiency gain from choosing the good project in stead of the bad project. In addition, we 
also assume that  1( / ) R B F π π − ∆ ≤ and we will show how this assumption affects our 
results in the following sections. 
The  financial  contract  consists  of  the  menu  of  repayments  of  the  bank  loans, 
1 2 2 1 2 2 {( , ),( , ),( , )} S F S F t t t t t t , depending on whether the firm succeeds or not. In date 1, if 
it succeeds, the firm repays 1 t , and  1 t if it fails. In date 2, the firm, which succeeded in 
date 1, repays  2S t  (resp.  2S t  ) if it succeeds again (resp. fails). Similarly, the firm, which 
failed  in  date  1,  repays  2F t  (resp.  2F t )  if  it  succeeds  (resp.  fails)  in  date  2.  The 















    We denote } 1 , 0 { ∈ i β  the probability that the bank (she) refinances the firm at the end 
of date 1 in a two-period dynamic model, where  s f i , = , i.e. fail or succeed. We also 
have the liquidation value, which is normalized to 0 . For simplicity, we assume that the 
discount factor is 1, which means the second period is as important as the first period. 
     Furthermore, we assume that the firm is protected by limited liability and he cannot be 
asked to repay the loan more than the outcomes that he actually gets. In addition, we 
assume that the firm’s choice is independent in both periods, which means, as stated, that 
the firm’s choice of project at date 2 does not depend on his choice at date 1.    9 
    The bank is a profit maximizing monopoly bank, whose utility could be presented as 
her profit, and she makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer of a contract to the firm. This bank 
defines  her  termination  rule  specified  in  the  contract for  the  sake  of maximizing her 
profits. In the benchmark, where there is only the bank-firm relationship, we will develop 
the bank’s optimal termination rule in the two-tier hierarchy, and check whether the bank 
can stick to this optimal termination rule. Then, we introduce the public ownership and 
investigate  how  commitment  of  termination  has  been  changed  by  the  government’s 
public-ownership oriented rescue. 
The  government’s  maximization  problem  is  to  form  a  policy  toward  the 
recapitalization of banks. A constraint on this policy is that any bank can get the policy 
subsidy from the government when it is insolvent, but also has to submit the profit to the 
government. Therefore the government should design a policy, whose components are: (1) 
maximize the expected social welfare U V + , where U is the firm’s utility and V  is the 
bank’s  utility; (2)  minimize  the social  cost of  the  transfer  between  the  bank  and  the 
government through collecting the public fund,  tT λ , where T is the transfer between the 
government and the bank. Then the government’s utility could be presented as follows: 
 
t W U V T λ = + −  
 
where  t λ is the transaction cost of collecting the public fund.   
    In the next section, when using the bank as a supervisor, the government has to add 
another object: (3) induce information revelation of the bank in the monitoring the firm 
and prevent collusion. 
 
2.1   Benchmark: no regulatory bailout 
 
  The  timing  is  simple:  at the  beginning  of  date  1,  the bank  offers  a contract  to  the 
firm 1 2 2 1 2 2 {( , ),( , ),( , ), } S F S F i t t t t t t β . The firm can choose from the good/bad project. At 
the end of date 1, the outcome is realized and the bank applies her termination rule which 
was announced at the beginning of date 1; at date 2, provided it is refinanced, the firm 
chooses  between  the  good  project  and  the bad  project  and  there  is  termination  with 
probability 1 at the end of this period.   10 
•  The Firm 
  The firm is protected by limited liability which could be presented as follows: 
( ) LL            j R t ≥  
( ) LL            0 j t ≥  
Given that the firm gets refinancing for date 2, we focus on the case where effort is 
valuable for the bank, which always wants to implement a high level of effort. We can 
thus describe the second-period incentive constraints as: 




− ≥ + −
∆
     when the firm succeeds in date 1 




− ≥ + −
∆
     when the firm fails in date 1 
If the firm chooses the good project in both periods, its utility could be presented as 
                      1 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 ( ) (1 )(0 ) [ ( ) (1 )(0 )] S GG s S U R t t R t t π π π β π π = − + − − + − + − −  
             2 1 1 2 1 (1 ) [ ( ) (1 )(0 )] F f F R t t π β π π + − − + − −  
and if the firm chooses the bad project in both periods, its utility could be presented as 
                     1 2 0 1 0 0 0 2 0 ( ) (1 )(0 ) [ ( ) (1 )(0 ) ] S BB s S U R t t B R t t B π π π β π π = − + − − + + − + − − +  
             2 0 0 2 0 (1 ) [ ( ) (1 )(0 ) ] F f F R t t B π β π π + − − + − − +  
If we want to induce the firm to choose the good project in both periods, we have to 
reward it enough through satisfying intertemporal incentive compatibility constraint:       
  12 ( ) IC           GG BB U U ≥  
In the appendix, we verify that if  12 ( ) IC is satisfied, the firm prefers choosing the good 
project in both periods to choosing the good project in one period but the bad project in 
the  other  period.  Therefore,  12 ( ) IC is  the  only  relevant  intertemporal  incentive 
compatibility constraint. (See the appendix for the proof) 
 
•   The Bank 
    The termination rule  i β  could be  regarded as an instrument that the bank imposes 
threat on the firm: If the firm chooses the bad project in date 1, it has higher probability 
of failure and the expected repayment is much less than the amount when it succeeds; 
knowing that, the bank can close the refinance channel to the firm in date 2 and make the 
firm lose the date-2 rent or the private benefit as a punishment.    11 
 
    First, we look at the bank’s problem: 
1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 1
, ,
(1 ) [ (1 ) ] (1 ) [ (1 ) ]
j i j
S F s S f F
t t
MaxV t t F t t F t t F
β
π π π β π π π β π π = + − − + + − − + − + − −
         
s.t.           ( ) LL        j R t ≥  
                ( ) LL        0 j t ≥  




− ≥ + −
∆
 




− ≥ + −
∆
 
                 12 ( ) IC                        GG BB U U ≥  
  PROPOSITION  1  In  this  two-tier  bank-firm  relationship,  the  optimal  contract  is 
described as follows: 
•  The optimal termination rule of the private bank is: * 1 s β = ,  * 0 f β = ;  











, depending on 
the firm’s performance in both periods (where S stands for success in date 1), and 
there is no repayment for the case when the firm fails in date-1.  
•  In date 1, the firm gets no rent and all the revenue is transfered to the bank. The 
optimal repayments are  1 t R = , 1 0 t = . 
•  the bank’s profit with commitment is : 
2
1 0
1 1 2 2
1 0
( 1)





= + − −
−
 
•   the bank would like to lend the credit to the firm if and only if 
2
1 0















    Actually,  by  sticking  to  this  optimal  termination  rule,  the  bank  has  to  apply  the 
liquidation when the firm fails in date 1 but chooses the good project in date 2, since we 
assume 1( ) B R F π π ∆ − ≤ , which means, at the end of date1 the expected project value if the 
firm chooses the good project in date 2 is less than the liquidation value. However, the 
bank gains by saving the rent that she has to leave to the firm in order to induce its effort.  
Therefore the optimal contract is renegotiation proof. 
   12 
2.2   Rescue and Commitment 
 
    Now we introduce public ownership into the banking system. The owner of the bank is 
the national government and his goal is to square up the bank’s loss and keep the bank in 
the safe situation. Specially when the bank faces the failed firm and gets negative payoff, 
the  government  can  inject  public  fund,  recapitalize  the  bank,  and  write-off  the  non-
performing loans. It seems that the bank is protected by limited liability since the bank 
can get certain amount of profit when the firm succeed and get at least zero when the firm 
fails. On the other hand, the government can also use the profit of the bank as a political 
loan. Such kind of transfer is costly because of the transaction cost of public funds t λ . We 
denote W the government’s utility when he recapitalizes the bank, then the components 
of the government’s bank bailout policy are: (1) maximize the expected social welfare (2) 
minimize  the  social  cost  of  transfer  between  the  bank  and  the  government  through 
collecting the public fund,  tT λ , where 
  1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 (1 ) [ (1 ) ] (1 ) [ (1 ) ] S F s S f F T t t F t t F t t F π π π β π π π β π π = + − − + + − − + − + − −  
Therefore the government’s optimal program is:  
{ , , } j j
t i t t Max W U V T
β
λ = + −  = 1 1 1 [1 (1 ) ]( ) s f t R F T π β π β π λ + + − − −  
S.t     2 ( ) S IC , 2 ( ) F IC , 12 ( ) IC ,( ) LL , ( ) LL  
We have proposition 2 which states the new contract framework after we introduce the 
government: 
PROPOSITION  2  when  we  have  the  “government-bank-firm”  hierarchy,  the 
optimal financial contract is modified as: 
•  Refinancing probabilities become:  1
P
s β = , 1
P
f β =  
•  The repayments are  
1 t R = , 1 0 t = , 






























= − − +
−
   13 
•  the bank would like to participate in this financial contract if and only if: 
2
1 0















We can see that with public ownership the termination of refinancing the failed firm is no 
longer credible even it is efficient to liquidate ex post. The government would like to 
continue refinancing for sake of social value of the project after he internalizes the firm 
and  the  bank’s  utilities.  As  we  can  say,  there  is  no  commitment  on  termination  of 
refinancing the bad-performing firm and the soft budget constraint problem comes out of 
public ownership. 
    Moreover,  it  is  easy  to  verify  that 2 1 F F > ,  which  means,  when  there  exists  public 
ownership and the government would like to recapitalize the bank in any case, the bank is 
less  prudent  and  invests  more  than  the  case  when  she  is  a  private  bank  without 
government bailout, because with public ownership the  government  will stand out to 
compensate the bank’s loss and keep the bank in the safe situation.  
    Therefore, when the government comes to capitalize the bank, the termination at the 
end  of  date  1  is  no  longer  credible.  By  anticipating  this  loss  of  commitment  on 
termination, the firm might also lose the ex ante incentive to exert effort in two periods. 
The government needs to look for other instruments to restore the efficiency. One of 
them is the supervision technology used by the government in the next section. 
 
3. Supervision Technology: Inspection and Correction 
 
    In  the  previous  section  2.2  we  find  out  that  the  government’s  public-ownership 
oriented rescue leads to the bank’s non-commitment to stop refinancing the firm when it 
fails in date 1. This loss of commitment makes it more expensive for the government to 
induce effort since he loses threat on the firm when he loses commitment. Specially, 
when the private benefit is higher, the rent that the government has to leave to the firm to 
induce it to choose the good project augments. This augmentation of rent will enter the 
government’s capitalization cost, as well as into the bank’s utility, as a negative effect. 
Therefore, the government prefers looking for other kinds of threat to induce efforts.   14 
    In this section, we first introduce another instrument to restore the firm’s incentive-- 
the  bank’s  supervision  (inspection  and  correction),  and  then  we  look  for  the  optimal 
contract  design.  Here  the  bank  acts  as  a  supervisor,  as  well  as  a  credit  lender.  The 
simplest supervision case is studied in section 3.1 where there is no collusion in this two-
tier hierarchy. In section 3.2, we introduce public ownership to the banking system and 
add the government as the third layer on the top. Under this three-tier hierarchy, we 
consider the possibility of collusion, where the firm will bribe the bank not to reveal the 
information which he finds or to misreport the information. 
 
3.1  Supervision without collusion 
 
  In this section we only consider two-tier relationship between the bank and the firm. 
With the same assumptions in the benchmark, the additional inspection and correction 
are presented as follows: after the firm chooses the project, the bank will use supervision 
technology to inspect whether the firm has chosen the bad project. We assume that with 
probability ξ  the bank (supervisor) finds the evidence 0 π σ =  given the firm has chosen 
the  bad  project.  After  this  inspection,  the  bank  (supervisor)  can  make  correction  to 
eliminate the private benefit B  and raise the probability of success from  0 π to 1 0' π π ≤ . 
The cost of the supervisor’s corrective action is normalized to 0. In other words, the 
supervisor can apply this inspection and correction costless. In this section, there is no 
space that collusive behavior can emerge from this two-tier hierarchy. 
  The sequence of events in this two-period model is illustrated in Figure 3: 
 
Figure 3 
                                                 Inspection                                                    outcome
F chooses project                        Correction
                                                 S finds the evidence
  vs                                            with prob.      that F                                     termination rule
                                                 has chosen the bad
                                                 project
                                                 If S finds the evidence
                                                 she can eliminate B and
                                                 raise prob. of success
                                                 from      to




F chooses project                                                                                            outcome
1 0 ' π π ≤  15 
•  The Firm 
 
  In date 1, if the firm chooses the bad project, in his inspection the supervisor will find 
the evidence 0 π σ =  with probability ξ . After this inspection, the supervisor can make 
correction to eliminate the private benefit B  and raise the probability of success from 
0 π to 1 0' π π ≤ . In other words, we can also regard the probability of success under the 
supervisor’s inspection and correction is  0 0 (1 ) ' π ξπ ξ π = + − . At this moment, the private 
benefit when the firm chooses the bad project decreases to  (1 )B ξ −  if the supervisor 
finds the evidence and eliminates B ξ . As a consequence, the repayments in date 1 could 
be  divided  into  two  packages:  one  is  with  the  evidence{ } 1 1 ,
e e t t ,  the  other  is  without 
evidence  { } 1 1 ,
n n t t .  The  probabilities  of  continuation  also  correspond  to  these  two 
packages,  depending  not  only  on  success  or  failure,  but  also  on  with  the  evidence 
{ } , , , s e f e β β or without evidence { } , , , s n f n β β . Assume that the firm is protected by limited 
liability which is presented as follows: 
( ) LL                  j R t ≥  
( ) LL                 0 j t ≥  
With risk neutrality and no time impatience, it is optimal for the bank to leave the rent 
only at the end of date 2 and leave no rent to the firm at the end of date 1 no matter the 
supervisor finds the evidence or not. That is: 
1 1
e n t t R = = , 
1 1 0
e n t t = = . 
  In date 2, the firm’s repayment packages also depend on whether the supervisor finds 
the evidence or not. We should add superscripts, “e” and “n”, to the date-2 repayment 
variables. 
with the evidence{ } 2 2 2 2 , ; ,
e e e e
S F S F t t t t , 
without evidence { } 2 2 2 2 , ; ,
n n n n
S F S F t t t t  
 Therefore, with the evidence, the bank would leave no rent to the firm in date 2 no 
matter it succeeds or fails, in order that the bank can apply the severest punishment to the   16 
firm who chooses the bad project and add more incentive into date 1. The repayments 
are as same as in date 1: 
2 2
e e
S F t t R = = , 
2 2 0
e e
S F t t = = . 
    If  the  supervisor  finds  no  evidence,  the  firm’s  date-2  incentive  compatibility 
constraints are as same as those in section 2: 






− ≥ + −
∆
     when the firm succeeds in date 1 






− ≥ + −
∆
     when the firm fails in date 1 
    Combining limited liability constraints, we can find that 2 2 0, 0
n n
S F t t ≥ ≥ and  2 ( ) F IC  are 
binding, which give three repayments:  
2 2 0
n n










    Now, let us look at the intertemporal incentive compatibility constraints: 
    If the firm chooses the good project in both periods, and its performance could not be 
found as evidence in the supervisor’s inspection, its utility could be presented as 
                      1 2 1 1 1 1 , 1 2 1 ( ) (1 )(0 ) [ ( ) (1 )(0 )]
n n n n
S GG s n S U R t t R t t π π π β π π = − + − − + − + − −  
             2 1 , 1 2 1 (1 ) [ ( ) (1 )(0 )]
n n
F f n F R t t π β π π + − − + − −  
If the firm chooses the bad project in both periods, its performance could be detected and 
corrected with probability ξ by the supervisor in date 1. Its utility is therefore:    
' '
1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 [ ( ) (1 )(0 )] (1 )[ ( ) (1 )(0 ) ]
e e e e
CB U R t t R t t B ξ π π ξ π π = − + − − + − − + − − +                             
' '
2 2 0 , 0 2 0 0 , 0 2 0 { [ ( ) (1 )(0 ) ] (1 ) [ ( ) (1 )(0 ) ]}
e e e e
S F s e S f e F R t t B R t t B ξ π β π π π β π π + − + − − + + − − + − − +
2 2 0 , 0 2 0 0 , 0 2 0 (1 ){ [ ( ) (1 )(0 ) ] (1 ) [ ( ) (1 )(0 ) ]}
n n n n
S F s n S f n F R t t B R t t B ξ π β π π π β π π + − − + − − + + − − + − − +
 
If the bank wants to induce the firm to choose the good project in both periods, she has to 
reward the firm enough to satisfy this intertemporal incentive compatibility constraint:       
  12 ( ) ' IC           CB GG U U ≥    17 
As same as in section 2, it is easy to verify that if  12 ( ) ' IC is satisfied, the firm prefers 
choosing the good project in both periods to choosing the good project in one period but 
the bad project in the other and being corrected by the supervisor. Therefore,  12 ( ) ' IC is 
the only relevant intertemporal incentive compatibility constraint. 
 
•  The Bank 
 
    Here the bank acts not only as a lender, but also a supervisor. The bank’s objective 
function is changed due to the supervision technology. However, it is still in the bank’s 
interest  to  induce  the  firm  to  choose  the  good  project  in  both  periods  and  on  the 
equilibrium path the bank could not find any evidence. Supervision plays a rule of threat 
and helps the bank to leave less rent to the firm in the optimal contract. 
1 2 2 1 1 1 1 , 1 2 1 1 , 1 2 1
, ,
(1 ) [ (1 ) ] (1 ) [ (1 ) ]
j i j
n n n n n n
S F s n S f n F
t t
Max t t F t t F t t F
β
π π π β π π π β π π + − − + + − − + − + − −
s.t.           ( ) LL ( ) LL 2 ( ) S IC 2 ( ) F IC 12 ( ) ' IC  
    We summarize the results in the following proposition 3. 
PROPOSITION  3  when  we  have  bank-firm  relationship  with  supervision 
technology, the optimal financial contract is modified as: 
•  when  the  bank  finds  evidence  in  date  1,  refinancing  probabilities  are: 
, 0 s e β = , , 0 f e β = ;  when  the  bank  finds  no  evidence  in  date  1,  the  optimal 
termination rule of the bank should be  , 1 s n β = ,  , 0 f n β = ;.  
•  The optimal repayments when there is the evidence 1
e t R = ,  1 0
e t = ; when there is 
no evidence  1 0
n t = ,  1













•  the bank’s profit under supervision technology is : 
2
1 0










= + − −
− −
 
•   the bank would like to lend the credit to the firm if and only if 
2
1 0













    The firm will not get refinanced when there is the evidence, no matter it succeeds or 
fails. Under this contract framework, we can then put the harshest punishment if the firm   18 
chooses the bad project. Therefore, we add more incentive into the contract and save 
more rent. 
    We can compare 3 F with  1 F in proposition 1. It is not surprising that  3 1 F F > , which 
means when there is supervision, the bank significantly saves the rent that he has to leave 
to the firm and has relatively higher utility than the case when there is no supervision. 
Therefore when she breaks even, the bank has more ability to lend, which is shown in 
figure 4. 
(insert figure 4 here) 
 
3.2  Supervision and public ownership 
3.2.1  Collusion free supervision 
    In this section, we introduce public ownership into the banking system with the same 
pattern as that in section 2.2, and the bank plays a supervision rule too. First, we assume 
that the bank is benevolent. Therefore, the government does not need to give her any rent 
to induce her to reveal the information and not to get captured by the firm. The reward 
from  the  government  to  the  bank  is  only  to  cover  her  reserved  utility  0 s  and let her 
participate into this financial contract. 
             ( ) SIR                   0 S s ≥  
The transaction cost,  t λ , has also been taken into account when the government reward 
the  bank  S .  In  addition,  we  assume  that  the  government  can  commit  to  reward  the 
supervisor in any case, i.e. the supervisor’s salary does not depend on whether she finds 
the evidence or not. 
    As same as before, the government is always the backup to square up the bank’s loss 
and to keep the bank in the safe situation. Specially when the bank faces the failed firm 
and can not break even, the government can recapitalize the bank, pay the bill and settle 
the bank’s loss to zero. Such kind of recapitalization is costly because of the transaction 
cost of public funds  t λ . The utility of the government is the combination of both the bank 
and the firm’s utilities, minus the disutility of public funds transaction:   19 
( ) t W U V T S λ = + − +
1 , 1 , 1 1 1 1 , 1 2 1 , 1 2 0 [1 (1 ) ]( ) { ( ) (1 ) ( ) }
n n n
s n f n t s n S f n F R F t F t F t F s π β π β π λ π π β π π β π = + + − − − − + − + − − +
 
As same as before, the government has to satisfy the following constraints:   
2 ( ) S IC , 2 ( ) F IC , 12 ( ) IC ,( ),( ) LL LL ,( ) SIR  
Using the same analysis as in section 3.1, we have proposition 4 which sets up the new 
contract framework after we introduce public ownership: 
PROPOSITION 4 when we have the “government-bank-firm” hierarchy and the 
bank also acts as a supervisor, the optimal financial contract is modified as: 
•  When  the  bank  finds  evidence  in  date  1,  refinancing  probabilities  are: 
, 0 s e β = , , 0 f e β = ;  When  the  bank  finds  no  evidence  in  date  1,  the  optimal 
termination rule of the bank should be  , 1 s n β = ,  , 1 f n β = . 
•  The optimal repayments are as same as in proposition 3, except 
             
2
1 0 0 0 1
2 2 2
1 0
(1 )(2 )/ ( 1)
(1 )
n
S t R B
ξ π π π π π π
π ξ π












•  The government’s utility under supervision is : 
2 2
1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1
1 0 2 2
1 0




t t W R F B B s
π ξ π π π π π π π π
λ π λ
π π ξ π
  − − − ∆ + + − −
= + − + + −  
∆ − −  
 
•  The bank would like to lend the credit to the firm if and only if 
2 2
1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1
4 1 0 2 2
1 0
[(1 )(2 )/ ( 1)] (1 )
2(1 ) (1 )
t
t
F F R B B s
λ π ξ π π π π π π π π
π
λ π π ξ π
  − − − ∆ + + − −
≤ = + + −  
+ ∆ − −  
 
Remark 
    By  comparing the rents which are left to the firm in both packages (with the 
evidence and without evidence), we find out that supervision technology helps the 
government to save the rent  2 ( )
n
S R t − which, otherwise, should be left to the firm in 
order to induce efforts. In other words, the government improves his welfare by 
using this supervision technology if  0 s is relatively small.   
    In addition, if other things don’t change, the increase of probability of finding the 
evidence ξ  will decrease the rent 2 ( )
n
S R t − , which should be left to the firm. That 
means, more efficient supervision technology will definitely decrease the rent in this 
financial contract. This is exactly the case that, in most developed countries where   20 
more advanced auditing and other information revelation systems are available, the 
principal does not have to give so much rent to the agent in order to induce efforts if 
supervision technology is applied. 
    Moreover, it is not difficult to find that the increase of  π ∆  will decrease the rents 
not  only  in  the  supervision  case,  but  also  in  the  non-supervision  case,  caeteris 
paribus.  This  can  explain  why  it  is  more  difficult  to  induce  efforts  in  most 
developing countries in their financial contracts. In fact, most developing countries 
don’t have many good projects with higher probability of success. Generally, the 
difference between success and failure of each project is relatively smaller compared 
to the average level in majority of developed countries. Therefore, the principal has 
to leave more rents to the agent to induce effort. 
    Furthermore, introducing public ownership into the banking system changes the 
termination rule even though there is a supervision technology. It is just as same as 
the case where the government has leniency towards the firm and subsidies the firm 
through the bank. As a consequence, there is space for the bank and the firm to 
extract subsidies from the government which are used for bailout. This is the case in 
the  next  subsection  where  we  take  into  account  the  collusive  behavior  of  the 
supervisor bank. 
 
3.2.2  Collusion and Commitment 
    In this subsection, we relax the assumption that the bank is benevolent and does not 
accept the bribe from the firm. With this collusive supervisor, not only do we compare 
the results with those when there is collusion-free supervision, but also we look at how 
the  bribe  varies  according  to  the  changes  of  commitment  after  introducing  public 
ownership. At last, we find that the government would like to restore commitment, i.e. to 
stop refinancing the bad-performing firm, in order to save the reward to the supervisor for 
preventing collusion. In other words, the possibility of collusion forces the government to 
harden the budget constraint.  
    In date 1, when the supervisor finds the evidence and also declares that the firm has 
chosen the bad project, the continuation possibilities are  , 0 s e β = , , 0 f e β = and there is no 
rent left to the firm in date 2, which could be regarded as a quite rigorous punishment. On   21 
the  contrary,  if  the  supervisor  declares  that  she  finds  nothing,  the  continuation 
possibilities  are , 1 s n β = , , 1 f n β =  and  there  is  rent  left  if  the  firm  succeeds  in  date  2. 
Therefore, the firm has more advantages if there is no declared evidence. In order to get 
refinancing and reap the date-2 rent, the firm is willing to pay the supervisor not to make 
the inspection and correction. Thus, the bank (supervisor) and the firm may collude and 
hide  the  information  from  the  government.  On  one  hand,  the  supervisor  will  be 
indifferent towards releasing information which will cause the firm to lose possibility of 
refinancing, as well as the date-2 rent; On the other hand, the firm will be ready to “buy 
the  supervisor’s silence”
‡.  Following  Laffont and  Tirole  (1990)  we  assume  there are 
transaction costs connected to side contracting between the bank (supervisor) and the 
firm; if the firm transfers one unit of wealth to the bank (supervisor) this is worth only 
1 < k  units to the bank (supervisor). The parameter k  can be interpreted as a measure of 








.  c λ  is the transaction cost of side transfers, reflecting the risks of being 
caught, the inefficiencies of bargaining and the costs incurred to avoid being identified. 
They are taken here as exogenous. For  0 = k it is impossible for the firm to make any 
transfer to the bank (supervisor), so collusion in the form considered here would not be 
feasible.(Any amount transferred from the firm would be lost, or at least valued at zero 
by  the  supervisor.)  As  the  transaction  costs  decrease,  k  increases,  and  it  becomes 
“easier” for the two parties to collude. Let b  denote the transfer from the firm to the bank 
(supervisor). And we also assume that the bank (supervisor) has all the bargaining power 
in the side contract and she makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the firm. For simplicity, 
we assume that the side contract the supervisor offered to the firm is a short time contract 




    In order to deter collusion between the bank (supervisor) and the firm, the transfer of 
the  government  to  the  bank  when  the  latter  uncovers  a  bad  project  should  satisfy 
collusion proofness condition: 
                                                 
‡ The similar auditing model is presented by Kofman and Lawarree (1993).   22 
    ) (CP        0 S s kb ≥ +       
Obviously, the bribe b should be the total stake of the firm in this financial contract: if 
the supervisor reveals the information she has found, the firm has the repayment package-
with the evidence; otherwise, if the supervisor finds nothing or she pretends to declare 
that she find nothing, the firm has the repayment package-without evidence. The total 
stake is the rent difference between these two packages. 
    Given  the  firm  chooses  the  bad  project  in  both  periods,  we  denote 
n U the  firm’s 
intertemporal  utility  when  there  is  no  supervisor’s  revelation,  and 
e U the  firm’s 
intertemporal utility when there is supervisor’s revelation.  
0 , 0 2 0 , 0 2 [ ( ) ] (1 ) [ ( ) ]
n n n
s n S f n F U B R t B R t B π β π π β π = + − + + − − +  
, 2 , 2 0 [ ( ) ] (1 ) [ ( ) ]
e e e
s e S f e F U R t B R t B πβ π π β π = + − + + − − +  
If the supervisor finds the evidence, the firm can gain rent 
n e b U U = − by bribing the 
supervisor to hide the evidence. As the bank (supervisor) has all the bargaining power in 
this side contract, all the rent must go into the pocket of the bank. Therefore, in order to 
prevent collusion between the bank and the firm, the government’s reward to the bank 
should not be lower than this amount. 
Therefore, the optimization program of the government is: 
 
{ , , , } ( )
i j j
t t t S Max W V U T S
β λ = + − +  
S.t.  2 ( ) S IC , 2 ( ) F IC , 12 ( ) ' IC ,( ),( ) LL LL ,( ) SIR , ) (CP  
Before looking for the optimal contract, we can first consider the contract framework 
when there is no commitment on the termination, i.e. , 1 f n β =  . Meanwhile, we take into 
account  the  collusive  behavior  between  the  supervisor  and  the  firm.  The  contract 
structure  is  as  same  as  that  in  proposition  4,  except  the  change  of  the  salary  for 
supervisor: S changes from  o s to  0 s kb + . 
Recall that in section 2.1, commitment on the termination, i.e. , 0 f n β =  , as an efficient 
instrument of threat, helps the principal to reduce the rent left to the firm. The loss of 
commitment  comes  from  the  public  ownership  of  the  banking  system  and  the 
government’s  maximization  of  the  social  value  of  the  project.  This  social  value   23 
dominates the effect of decreased rents. However, when there is possibility of collusion, 
these decreased rents not only affect the bribe that the firm can offer to the supervisor, 
but  also  affect  the  rewards  that  the  government  has  to  pay  the  supervisor  to  deter 
collusion. Both effects might dominate the social value of the project. 
Furthermore,  we  look  at  the  contract  structure  when  there  is  commitment  on  the 
termination under the supervision technology and the collusion possibility 
•  Refinancing probabilities are:  , 0
MC
s e β = , , 0
MC
f e β = ,  , 1
MC
s n β = , , 0
MC
f n β = , where there 
is commitment on the bank’s original termination rule (here M stands for monitor 
(supervision) technology and C stands for commitment) 
The  optimal  payments  are  divided  into  two  packages,  depending  on  whether  the 
supervisor finds the evidence or not. If the supervisor finds the evidence, the repayments 
belong to the package-“with the evidence”: 
1
e t R = , 1 0
e t =  
















S t =  
1
n t R = ,  1 0
n t =  
Therefore, the bribe in the contract with commitment is: 
2 0












          (1) 
We compare this bribe with that when the termination rule is , 1
MN
s n β = ,  , 1
MN
f n β = , which 
means there is no-commitment to stop refinancing.  
2
2 1 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 2 2
1 0
(1 )(2 )/ ( 1) (1 )
2
(1 )
N b B B
ξ π π π π π π π π
π
π ξ π π
  − − − ∆ + + − −
= + +  
− − ∆  
        (2) 
We have 
N C b b >  after the comparison. Intuitively, if there is supervision technology, 
the  government  has  a  trade-off  between  continuation  and  saving  collusion-proofness 
reward (i.e. reducing potential bribe). In other words, being afraid of collusion prevailing 
in the banking system and paying too much reward to prevent collusion could make the 
government harden the budget constraint, i.e. restore the commitment to stop refinancing 
the bad-performing firm at the end of date 1.   24 
PROPOSITION  5  When  there  is  possibility  of  collusion,  the  government  will 
consider the trade-off between continuing and saving collusion-proofness reward. 
Such  costly  rewards  make  the  government  restore  the  commitment  on  the  stop 
refinancing the bad-performing firm. The optimal contract is presented as follows: 
•  Refinancing probabilities are:  , 1
MC
s n β = , , , , 0
MC MC MC
f n s e f e β β β = = = ; 
•  The optimal payments are divided into two packages, depending on whether 
the supervisor finds the evidence. If the supervisor finds the evidence, the 
repayments belong to the  package-with evidence: 
1
e t R = , 1 0
e t =  




S t t = = , 1















•  The government’s utility is:  1 1 0 (1 )(1 )( ) ( )
MC C















C b is presented in (1) 
•  Given the government will bail out the bank when she is in trouble, the bank 
















    Remark   
    We can compare the government’s utility and loan threshold with those when there 
is no commitment. 
1 0 2(1 )( ) ( )
MN N
t t W R F GB kb s λ π λ = − − + − −  
where
2
1 0 0 0 1 1 1
2 2
1 0




ξ π π π π π π π π
π ξ π π




N b is presented in 
(2) 
0
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Now  we  make  the  approximation:  since  the  difference  between 
C b and 
N b is  more 
significant  than  the  difference  between  2 and ( ) 1 1 π + ,  so  is  the  difference  between 
G andE , we can approximately only compare 
N GB kb − and
C EB kb − . It is not difficult 
to verify that
N C GB kb EB kb − < − . Here we come into a conclusion:  5 5
C NC F F > , which is 
presented in figure 4.  
(insert figure 4 here) 
    Furthermore,  let  us  look  at  the  non-performing  loans  under  the  public-ownership 
oriented rescue. Recall that the government’s utility is presented as follows: 
( ) t W V U T S λ = + − +  
The bank’s non-performing loans, which have been written-off by the government, are 
denoted as  NPLs V =  when V is negative and the government bails out the bank. Now 
we  consider  two  countries  whose  transaction  costs  of  the  side  contract 
are 1 k , 2 k respectively.  If  other  things  are  equal,  1 2 k k <  means  country  1  has  more 
efficient banking supervision system and it is more difficult for the bank to collude with 
the firm in country 1. Therefore, collusion-proofness rewards are less costly in country 1 
than in country 2. The efficiency gain from restoring commitment on termination in 
country  2 is higher than  that in  country  1. Given  that the  government  in  country 2 
chooses to restore commitment but the government in country 1 does not, assuming they 
all reward the bank to prevent collusion, the bank’s non-performing loans in country 1, 
however, are higher than those in country 2, i.e.  1 2 V V > . This result contrasts to the 
empirical  work  of  Bath,  Caprio  and  Levine  (2002),  which  finds  that  more  efficient 
monitoring, say, private monitoring of banks, are associated with less non-performing 
loans. It is not difficult to explain the conflict between our result and theirs. First, from 
the analysis in section 2 we find that public ownership and the government’s lenient 
bailout cause non-performing loans, otherwise the bank alone will choose lower loan 
threshold  to  break  even.  Second,  under  more  efficient  monitoring  of  banks,  the 
government  pays  less  to  prevent  collusion.  As  a  consequence,  in  his  break-even 
condition, the government has more space to recapitalize the bank and to write off more 
non-performing loans. Our model shows the substitution between banking regulation and   26 
supervision,  where  the  former’s  effect  might  dominate  the  latter’s  effect.  However, 
special banking regulations, such as government’s bailout and preventing collusion are 
not taken into account by Bath, Caprio and Levine, probably because of data availability. 
All  these  missing  factors  will  definitely  affect  the  amount  of  non-performing  loans. 
Therefore, it is not so surprising that there might be opposite results. 
 
4  Conclusion 
 
    This paper studies how the soft budget constraint, which prevails in the banking system 
of  transition  economies,  affects  the  collusion  problem,  and  how  collusion,  however, 
functions as a hardening budget constraint device. First, we show that public ownership 
and the government’s rescue cause the soft budget constraint problem on the local level, 
i.e. between the bank and the firm, which is specified as the commitment to terminate 
refinancing the bad-performing firm at the end of date 1 in a two-period model. As the 
soft budget constraint emerges, there are more rents in the financial contract and SBC 
makes it more attractive for the bank (supervisor) to collude with the firm, i.e. SBC 
exacerbates  the  collusion  problem  and  makes  it  more  costly  for  the  government  to 
prevent collusion through rewarding the bank. On the other hand, more costly collusion-
proofness reward imposes more pressure on the government to restore commitment, i.e. 
to harden budget constraint. As a result, collusion becomes an efficient device to alleviate 
the soft budget constraint problem in the public- owned banking system. 
    The analysis in this paper can endow us some policy implications. Above all, forcing 
accurate information disclosure in the supervision technology can efficiently decrease the 
rent in the financial contract. In our model, it is the increase of ξ ,  which decreases the 
rents not only in the non-commitment case, but also in the commitment case. Second, if 
there is always government’s bailout to the insolvent bank, efficient monitoring by the 
bank will not definitely lead to few non-performing loans. This shows the substitution 
between  the  banking  regulation  and  supervision,  which  have  been  widely  thought 
complementary to each other. Specifically, it is the case in our model where the country 
with more efficient banking supervision, whosek  is lower, might have higher level of 
non-performing loans. Third, collusion serves as a commitment-enhancing device only if 
the  government  chooses  to  reward  the  bank  to  prevent  collusion.  If  the  government   27 
chooses punishment instead of  reward, it is not always the  case that collusion has a 
positive side effect. The last but not least, restoring more efficiency depends on the ex 
ante  government’s  commitment  not  to  rescue  the  bank,  i.e.  solving  the  soft  budget 
constraint  problem  on  the  government-bank  level.  In  order  to  make  this  ex  ante 
commitment more credible, one way is to introduce privatization to the banking system 
and to break up the public ownership of the bank. Allowing some part of private shares in 
the state owned bank will improve the prudence of each loan decision and help to harden 
budget constraints. This is an application of the well-known idea that the incentives of an 
agent can be improved if the principal’s objective function is less comprehensive than the 
social welfare, and in particular, if it is insensitive to the private interests of the agent. 
Another way is decentralization of credit and introducing bankruptcy into the banking 
system.  Decentralization  of  credit  makes  each  local  bank  under  liquidity  constraints. 
Introducing bankruptcy of banks cuts the way of rescue that the local bank might pursue 
from  the  government  (the  central  bank).  These  devices  will  help  to  harden  budget 
constraints and make the creditor more prudent. However, this bankruptcy policy should 
not be so radical because the central bank also acts as lender of last resort. Therefore, the 
central bank would restrict bankruptcy to small banks and bailout to very large banks for 
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APPENDIX 
A.1 Verify 12 ( ) IC ’s relevance in section 2 
•  If the firm prefers choosing the good project in both periods to choosing the bad 
project in both periods, we have the firm’s preference: ( ; , ) ( ; , ) s f s f G G G B B B ≻  
Recall the firm’s incentive constraints in date-2 are: 




− ≥ + −
∆
     when the firm succeeds in date 1 




− ≥ + −
∆
     when the firm fails in date 1 
and the firm’s limited liability constraints: 
( ) LL        j R t ≥  
( ) LL        0 j t ≥  
Supposing  12 ( ) IC is the only relevant intertemporal incentive constraint, we have  2 ( ) F IC , 
( ) LL , ( ) LL ,  12 ( ) IC binding. 
The first optimal repayments of the firm are as follows: 
1 2 2 0 S F t t t = = = ,     1 t R = , 






















it is easy to verify that  2 ( ) S IC is satisfied under this optimal repayments structure. 
•  If the firm prefers choosing the good project in both periods to choosing the good  
project  in  date-1  but  the  bad  project  in  date-2,  we  have  the  firm’s  preference:  
( ; , ) ( ; , ) s f s f G G G G B B ≻  
Supposing  GG GB U U ≥ is the only relevant intertemporal incentive constraint: 
1 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 ( ) (1 )(0 ) [ ( ) (1 )(0 )] S s S R t t R t t π π π β π π − + − − + − + − −  
          2 1 1 2 1 (1 ) [ ( ) (1 )(0 )] F f F R t t π β π π + − − + − −  
≥    1 2 1 1 1 1 0 2 0 ( ) (1 )(0 ) [ ( ) (1 )(0 ) ] S s S R t t R t t B π π π β π π − + − − + − + − − +  
                                                   2 1 0 2 0 (1 ) [ ( ) (1 )(0 ) ] F f F R t t B π β π π + − − + − − +  
Combining the other constraints 2 ( ) F IC ,( ) LL ,( ) LL , we could get the firm’s repayments 
structure and the constraint  2 ( ) S IC is satisfied under this repayments structure.:   29 
1 2 2 0 S F t t t = = = ,     1 t R = , 















It is not difficult to find that the only change of repayments is  2S t , where
(2) (1)
2 2 S S t t ≥ . That 
means the firm can get more rent under the first repayment structure. In other words, 
under  the  first  optimal  repayment  structure,  the  intertemporal  incentive  constraint 
GG GB U U ≥ is satisfied automatically. Therefore, this constraint GG GB U U ≥ is not relevant. 
•  If the firm prefers choosing the good project in both periods to choosing the bad  
project  in  date-1  but  the  good  project  in  date-2,  we  have  the  firm’s  preference:  
( ; , ) ( ; , ) s f s f G G G B G G ≻ . 
Supposing  GG BG U U ≥ is the only relevant intertemporal incentive constraint: 
1 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 ( ) (1 )(0 ) [ ( ) (1 )(0 )] S s S R t t R t t π π π β π π − + − − + − + − −  
          2 1 1 2 1 (1 ) [ ( ) (1 )(0 )] F f F R t t π β π π + − − + − −  
≥    1 2 0 1 0 0 1 2 1 ( ) (1 )(0 ) [ ( ) (1 )(0 )] S s S R t t B R t t π π π β π π − + − − + + − + − −  
                                                   2 0 1 2 1 (1 ) [ ( ) (1 )(0 )] F f F R t t π β π π + − − + − −  
Combining the other constraints 2 ( ) F IC ,( ) LL ,( ) LL , we could get the firm’s repayments 
structure, and the constraint  2 ( ) S IC is satisfied under this repayments structure.: 
1 2 2 0 S F t t t = = = ,     1 t R = , 


















as the same reasoning as before, the change of repayments shows us
(3) (1)
2 2 S S t t ≥ . That 
means under the first optimal repayment structure, the intertemporal incentive constraint 
GG BG U U ≥ is also satisfied. Therefore, this constraint GG BG U U ≥ is not relevant. 
 
To conclude, the optimal repayments structure is got under the relevant constraints: 
2 ( ) F IC , ( ) LL , ( ) LL ,  12 ( ) IC  
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A.2 Proof of Proposition 1 
Clearly, the bank wants to induce the firm to choose the good project for both periods. 
She  can  obtain  this  result  by  leaving  the  firm  enough  rent.  Therefore  the  dominant 
strategy is to give the firm rent when it succeeds and to leave no rent otherwise. 
By solving backward, we first look at the incentive compatibility constraints in date 2 
given that the firm has got the refinancing. 




− ≥ + −
∆
 




− ≥ + −
∆
 
We have shown in A.1 that  2 ( ) F IC is binding at the optimal, and  2 ( ) S IC is irrelevant. We 
have  the  relationship  between  2F t and  2F t  through 2 ( ) F IC .  Then  we  look  at  the 
intertemporel incentive compatibility constraint for date 1 and date 2. 
  We denote λ the Lagrangian multiplier for constraint 12 ( ) IC . The Lagrangian for this 
optimal programming problem could be presented as: 
( ) GG BB L V U U λ = + −  
First, as we should leave rent to the firm who succeeds in both periods, that is through 2S t , 









β π π λ π
π
∂
= − ∆ + =
∂
                       (1) 












from this result, we can directly have a result that the incentive compatibility constraint 
12 ( ) IC is binding. 
Second, we put the value of λ into 
2 2 1 1
, , ,
S F
L L L L
t t t t
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂



















Therefore, we have only the corner solutions for these variables.    31 
Taking into account limited liability constraints, the bank wants to get repayment as high 
as possible. Precisely, for ( ) LL , the relevant constraints are binding and we have 
1 2 2 0 S F t t t = = =  
and these results can also help to relax the incentive compatibility constraint.  
For ( ) LL , the relevant constraints are binding except  2S R t ≥ . We have: 
1 t R =  
And these results can also help to relax the incentive compatibility constraint. 








  Under the trade-off between leaving rent and inducing effort, we have verified that 
















Therefore, the bank’s profit is : 
2 3
1 0 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
1 0 1 0 1 0
[ ] {(1 )[ ( ) ] } s f
B
V R F B R F B R F B
π π π π
π π π β π π β
π π π π π π π
= − − + − − + − − − −
− − ∆ −
DeriveV  with respect to s β and f β :    
1 0















1 1 2 2
1 0






β π π π
∂
= − − − −
∂ ∆ −
 






,  1 0
1
2
π π > >  and  1 0 1 > +π π , we 
























Therefore we have the optimal termination rule: 
1 *= s β , 0 * = f β          32 
As a consequence, when the optimal termination rule is 1 * = s β , 0 *= f β , the repayment 












Now, we look at the bank’s profit under the full commitment to termination: 
2
1 0
1 1 1 2 2
1 0
( 1)





= + − − +
−
 
The bank wants to participate in this financial contract only if:  
2
1 0












                      Q.E.D 
 
Proof of Proposition 2 
In order to induce the firm to choose the good project for both periods, the government 
can get leave the firm enough rent. Consequently, the dominant strategy is to give the 
firm rent when it succeeds and leave no rent in any other cases. 
By solving backward, we first look at the incentive compatibility constraints in date 2 
given that the firm has got the refinancing. 




− ≥ + −
∆
 




− ≥ + −
∆
 
Suppose  that  2 ( ) F IC is  binding  at  the  optimal,  and  2 ( ) S IC is  irrelevant.  We  have  the 
relationship  between  2F t and  2F t  through 2 ( ) F IC .  Then  we  look  at  the  intertemporel 
incentive compatibility constraint for date 1 and date 2. 
  We denote µ the Lagrangian multiplier for constraint  12 ( ) IC .Using the same optimal 
programming method as in the proof of Proposition 1, we have Lagrangian function of 
the government’s optimal programming problem: 
( ) t GG BB L U V T U U λ µ = + − + −  
First, as we should leave rent to the firm who succeeds in both periods, that is through  2S t , 









β π λπ µ π
π
∂
= − + ∆ + =
∂
                       (1) 












From this result, we can directly have a result that the incentive compatibility constraint 
12 ( ) IC  is binding. 
Second, we put the value of λ into 
2 2 1 1
, , ,
S F
L L L L
t t t t
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂



















Therefore, we have only the corner solutions for these variables.  
Taking into account limited liability constraints, the bank wants to get repayment as high 
as possible. Precisely, for ( ) LL , the relevant constraints are binding and we have 
1 2 2 0 S F t t t = = =  
and these results can also help to relax the incentive compatibility constraint.  
For ( ) LL , the relevant constraints are binding except  2S R t ≥ . We have: 
2 1 F t t R = =  
And these results can also help to relax the incentive compatibility constraint. 
























Now we look at the effect of termination rule on the government’s objective function: 
1 0
1 1 2 2
1 0





π λ π λ
β π π
∂





1 1 2 2
1 0
(1 )
(1 )(1 )( ) [ ] 0 t t
f
W
R F B B
π π π
π λ π λ
β π π π
− ∂
= − − − + + >
∂ ∆ −
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which means that the optimal termination rule when the firm succeeds in date-1 is to 
refinance the firm in date 2, i.e. 1 s β = ; For the effect of  f β , with the assumption 1R F π > , 







. As a consequence, the optimal termination rule when 
the firm fails at the end of date-1 is  1 f β = . 
To  summarize,  when  we  introduce  the  public  ownership  to  the  bank,  the  optimal 
termination rule is changed into 
1
P
s β = , 1
P
f β =  
where P stands for public bank. 












which is as same as the result in Proposition 2. 











= − − +
−
 
The threshold of the credit for the bank to participate in this financial contract is: 
2
1 0
















Proof of Proposition 3 
As same  as in proposition 1, the bank wants to induce the firm to choose the good 
project for both periods. She can obtain this result by leaving the firm  enough  rent. 
Therefore the dominant strategy is to give the firm rent when it succeeds and to leave no 
rent otherwise. With the evidence, the bank would leave no rent to the firm in date 2 no 
matter it succeeds or fails, in order that the bank can apply the severest punishment to the 
firm to choose the bad project and add more incentive into date 1. The repayments are as 
same as in date 1:   35 
2 2
e e
S F t t R = = , 
2 2 0
e e
S F t t = = . 
Without  evidence,  we  use  the  standard  way  to  solve  backward.  First  we  look  at  the 
incentive compatibility constraints in date 2 given that the firm has got the refinancing. 






− ≥ + −
∆
 






− ≥ + −
∆
 
We have shown in A.1 that  2 ( ) F IC is binding at the optimal, and  2 ( ) S IC is irrelevant. We 
have  the  relationship  between  2F t and  2F t  through 2 ( ) F IC .  Combining  limited  liability 
constraints, we can find  2 2 0; 0
n n
S F t t ≥ ≥ ; 2 ( ) F IC binding. These give us three repayments:  
2 2 0
n n










Then we look at the intertemporel incentive compatibility constraint for date 1 and date 2. 
12 ( ) ' IC           GG BB U U ≥  
as same as in A.1, it is not difficult to verify that  12 ( ) ' IC is the only relevant intertemporal 
incentive compatibility constraint. Therefore, we have: 
' '
0 , 0 , 0 , 0 1 0 1
2 2 2
1 0 ,
(1 ) [ (1 ) ] (1 ) [(1 )(1 ) / ( 1)]
[ (1 ) ]




ξ ξ π β π β ξ π β ξ π π π π π β
π ξ π β
− + + − + − + − − ∆ + + −
= −
− −
the supervisor bank’s profit could be presented as:  
1 1 , 1 2 1 , 1 ( ) (1 ) [ ( ) ]
S n
s n S f n
B
V R F t F R F π π β π π β π
π




S V  with respect to , s e β , , f e β , , s n β and , f n β :    
1 0











β π ξ π
− ∂
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2
1 0 1 1 0
1 1 2 2
, 1 0
[(1 )(1 ) / ( 1)]






π ξ π π π π π
π π
β π π ξ π
− − ∆ + + − ∂
= − − − −
∂ ∆ − −
 






























 and the optimal termination rule 

































we compare this threshold ofR  with that when there is no supervision:  1 0 ˆ ˆ R R <  
therefore, we can show the final expression of  2
n













                                  when  1 ˆ R R ≥  
the optimal termination rule is  , , , 0 s e f e f n β β β = = = , , 1 s n β =  
therefore, the supervisor bank’s profit is finally:  
2
1 0










= + − −
− −
 
the bank wants to participate in this financial contract only if:  
2
1 0




















   37 
Reference: 
[1] Aghion,  P.,  P.  Bolton  and  S.  Fries  (1999),  ‘Financial  Restructuring  in  Transition 
Economies’, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, vol. (155), pp.51-70. 
[2] Bath, J.R., G. Caprio and R. Levine (2002), ‘Bank Regulation and Supervision: What 
Works best?’, NBER working paper. 
[3] Begg, D. and R. Portes (1993), ‘Enterprise debt and economic transformation: financial 
restructuring in Central and Eastern Europe’, In :Mayer, C. and X. Vives, eds, Capital 
Markets and Financial Intermediation, Cambridge University Press. 
[4] Bolton,  P.  and  D.S.  Scharfstein  (1990),  ‘A  Theory  of  Predation  Based  on  Agency 
Problems in Financial Contracting’, American Economic Review, vol 80(1), pp. 93-106 
[5] Coase, Ronald (1937), ‘The Nature of the Firm’, Economica, 4, pp.541-56 
[6] Dewatripont, Mathias and Eric Maskin (1995), ‘Credit and Efficiency in Centralized and 
Decentralized Economies’, Review of Economic Studies, 62. pp. 541-56. 
[7] Dewatripont, Mathias and Gerard Roland (1999), ‘Soft Budget Constraint, Transition and 
Financial System’, mimeo. 
[8] Faure-Grimaud, Antoine and Jean-Charles Rochet (1998), ‘A Positive Analysis of Bank 
Privatization in Transition Economies’, mimeo, London School of Economics. 
[9] Holmstrom, B and J. Tirole (1997), ‘Financial Intermediation, Loanable Funds, 
and the Real Sector’, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 112, no. 3, pp. 663-
691(29) 
[10]  Jensen, M. and W. Meckling (1976), ‘The Theory of the Firm, Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure’, Journal of Financial Economics, 3, pp.305-360 
[11]  Kofman, F. and J. Lawarree, (1993) ‘Collusion in Hierarchical Agency’, Econometrica, 
61, pp.629-656 
[12]  Kornai,  Janos(1979),  ‘Resource  constrained  versus  Demand  constrained  Systems’, 
Econometrica, 47, pp.801-19 
[13]  Kornai, Janos(1980), Economics of Shortage, Amsterdam: North Holland. 
[14]  Kornai,  Janos(1992),  The  Socialist  System:  The  Political  Economy  of  Communism. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
[15]  Laffont,  Jean-Jaques  and  Jean  Tirole  (1991),  ‘The  Politics  of  Government  Decision 
Making: A Theory of Governmenty Capture’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106, pp. 
1089-1127   38 
[16]  Maskin,  Eric  and  Chenggang  Xu  (2001),  ‘Soft  Budget  Constraint  Theories:  From 
Centralization to the Market’, Economy of Transition, Vol. 9 (1), pp.1-27 
[17]  Mitchell, J. (1994), « Strategic creditor passivity in economies in transition», mimeo, 
Cornell University. 
[18]  Modigliani, Fanco and Merton Miller (1958), ‘The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance, 
and the Theory of Investment’, American Economic Review, 48. pp. 261-97. 
[19]  Olsen, Tornd E. and Gaute Torsvik (1998), ‘Collusion and Renegotiation in Hierarchies: 
A Case of Beneficial Corruption’, International Economic Review, vol.39(2), pp. 413-
438 
[20]  Shleifer, Andrei and Robert Vishny (1994), ‘Politicians and Firms’, Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 109(4), pp. 995-1025. 
[21]  Tirole,  Jean  (1986),  ‘Hierarchies  and  Bureaucracies:  on  the  Role  of  Collusion  in 
Organizations’, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization,2, pp. 181-214 
[22]  Yi, Gang (2002), ‘Banks’ Bad Loans and Government’s Performance’, caijing, 15
th. Oct. 